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— ABSTRACT —
In the present paper the author considers a chal-
lenge to libertarianism posed by G�A� Cohen� The 
charge issued by Cohen says that libertarianism 
defines freedom in terms of justice and justice in 
terms of freedom� The paper deals with an aspect 
of this charge as expressed by one of Cohen’s 
thought experiments according to which it is not 
the case that the answer to the question whether 
person B forces person A to do φ depends on 
whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not� 
Employing the Hohfeldian analysis of fundamen-
tal jural conceptions, the author demonstrates 
that if person B’s actions are legitimate, then 
making person A to do φ cannot, at pains of con-
tradiction, be considered forcing� If person B is at 
a liberty to make person A to do φ, then person B 
cannot at the same time and in the same respect 
be at duty not to make person A to do φ� Yet, this 
is exactly what would follow if we adopted the 
stance that person B’s legitimate actions force 
person A to do φ� If they forced person A, then 
the expenditure of whatever labour needed to 
do φ would not be a voluntary expenditure and 
— ABSTRAKT —
Niniejszy artykuł rozważa zarzut wobec libertaria-
nizmu sformułowany przez G�A� Cohena� Zarzut 
ten mówi, że libertarianizm definiuje wolność 
w kategoriach sprawiedliwości, zaś sprawiedli-
wość w kategoriach wolności� Autor skupia się na 
szczególnym aspekcie tego zarzutu – wyrażonym 
w jednym z eksperymentów myślowych zapro-
ponowanych przez Cohena – zgodnie z którym 
odpowiedź na pytanie o to, czy osoba B zmusza 
osobę A do zrobienia φ nie zależy od tego, czy 
działania osoby B są prawowite, czy nie� Posłu-
gując się hohfeldowską analizą podstawowych 
pojęć jurydycznych, autor dowodzi, że jeżeli 
działania osoby B są prawowite, to skłonienie 
osoby A do podjęcia działania φ nie może – za 
cenę popadnięcia w sprzeczność – być uznane za 
przymus� Jeżeli osoba B ma wolność jurydyczną 
skłonienia osoby A do podjęcia działania φ, to 
osoba B nie może jednocześnie i pod tym samym 
względem mieć obowiązku nieskłonienia osoby 
A do podjęcia działania φ� Jednak dokładnie taki 
wniosek wynikałby z  przyjęcia stanowiska, że 
osoba B przez swoje prawowite działania mogłaby 
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INTRODUCTION
There is a circularity problem besetting the libertarian idea of freedom1� To the 
best of our knowledge this conundrum has been spotted for the first time by 
G�A� Cohen who pointed out that libertarianism defines freedom in terms of 
justice and justice in terms of freedom� As he noticed: “Thereby Nozick locks 
himself inside a circle� For Nozick, there is justice, which is to say no violation 
of anyone’s rights, when there is lack of coercion, which means that there is 
justice when there is no restriction on freedom� But freedom is then itself defined 
in terms of non-violation of rights, and the result is a tight definitional circle 
and no purchase either on the concept of freedom or the concept of justice” 
(Cohen, 1995, p� 61)� In the present paper we would like to focus only on a small 
aspect of this profound problem, an aspect which can yet appear very useful 
1 A precise definition of the libertarian idea of freedom has been provided by Rothbard who said 
that freedom is “a condition in which a person’s ownership rights in his own body and his legitimate 
material property are not invaded, are not aggressed against” (Rothbard, 2006, p� 50)� As one can 
readily see, on this account freedom is defined in terms of justice, i�e�, in terms of property rights� On 
the other hand, justice is invaded when “the aggressor imposes his will over the natural property of 
another – he deprives the other man of his freedom” (Rothbard, 1998, p� 45)� Hence, what is just and 
unjust is in turn determined by what does and what does not deprive the other man of his 
freedom� 
thereby would constitute a violation of person 
A’s rights to this labour� However, if person A’s 
rights were violated by person B’s actions, then 
via Hohfeldian Correlativity Axiom person B 
would have to be at duty not to undertake these 
actions� Yet, the whole reasoning started from 
the assumption that person B is at liberty to 
undertake them� 
Keywords: libertarianism, freedom, coercion, 
circularity, Hohfeld, G�A� Cohen
zmusić osobę A do zrobienia φ� Jeśli działania 
te zmuszałyby osobę A  do podjęcia działania 
φ, wówczas wydatkowanie jakiejkolwiek pracy 
związanej z robieniem φ byłoby przypadkiem jej 
niedobrowolnego wydatkowania i konstytuowało 
tym samym naruszenie praw osoby A do owej 
pracy� Jeżeli natomiast prawa osoby A do jej pracy 
faktycznie zostałyby naruszone przez działania 
osoby B, to zgodnie z hohfeldowskim aksjomatem 
korelatywności na osobie B musiałby spoczywać 
obowiązek niepodejmowania tych działań� Całe 
powyższe rozumowanie opiera się jednak na 
założeniu, że osoba B ma wolność jurydyczną do 
ich podjęcia�
Słowa kluczowe: libertarianizm, wolność, przy-
mus, błędne koło, Hohfeld, G�A� Cohen
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in attenuating the Cohen’s challenge� The aspect we have in mind involves the 
question of conditions under which an exchange of goods and services is a free 
exchange� When person A chooses to provide a service or a good to person 
B, the choice made by person A results in a valid property title transfer if and 
only if it is a free or voluntary choice� Obviously, a given choice is not free or 
voluntary when the chooser is forced or coerced by some other person to make 
it� But when is he forced or coerced? According to libertarianism, person B 
forces or coerces person A to make a choice if and only if actions undertaken 
by person B violate person A’s property rights2� As Nozick points out: “Whether 
a person’s actions are voluntary depends on what it is that limits his alternatives� 
If facts of nature do so, the actions are voluntary� Other people’s actions place 
limits on one’s available opportunities� Whether this makes one’s resulting action 
non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to act as they 
did” (Nozick, 2014, p� 262)� This of course makes an impression of circularity� 
A transfer of goods or services from person A to person B constitutes a violation 
of person A’s property rights when the transfer is unfree� The transfer is in turn 
unfree when it involves property rights violation� It seems that it would be better 
if libertarianism had independent account of freedom or voluntariness so as to 
explain valid property rights transfers in terms of freedom or voluntariness but 
not the other way around� Then, for instance, a transfer from person A to person 
B would constitute violation of person A’s property rights if it were unfree and 
2 Richard A� Epstein writes: “Suppose that B has agreed to clean A’s clothes for $10� After the work 
is done, B tells A that he will return the clothes only if A pays, or promises to pay, him $15� If A pays 
the $15, it is quite clear that he has an action to recover the $5 excess� B has put him to a choice be-
tween his clothes and his money� As in the case of duress by the threat of force, B has required A to 
abandon one of his rights to protect another, and the action to recover the $5 is designed to make 
certain that A will be able to protect them both…� Suppose that B at the outset refuses to clean A’s 
clothes unless A pays him $15, even when B’s previous price had been $10� There is no doubt that 
A is worse off on account of B’s decision to make a ‘take it or leave it’ offer, but it would be the gravest 
mistake to argue that B’s conduct constitutes actionable duress because it puts A to an uncomfortable 
choice� In- deed the case is sharply distinguishable both from the threats or use of force and from the 
duress of goods� In those two cases of duress, B put A to the choice between two of his entitlements� 
In this situation he only puts A to the choice between entitlement and desire, between A’s money, 
which he owns, and B’s services, which he desires� It is the very kind of choice involved in all exchan-
ges� A could not complain if B decided not to make him any offer at all; why then is he entitled to 
complain if B decides to make him better off by now giving him a choice when before he had none? 
If A does not like B’s offer, he can reject it; but to allow him to first accept the agreement and only 
thereafter to force B to work at a price which B finds unacceptable is to allow him to resort (with the 
aid of the state) to the very form of duress that on any theory is prohibited” (1975, p� 296, 297)�
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it would be unfree if person B made all other options unappealing for person A, 
regardless of whether person B had a right to make them unappealing or not� 
In the present paper we will try to demonstrate that even though the libertarian 
account of freedom might suffer from circularity, the alternative, descriptive 
account suggested by Cohen seems to suffer from contradiction3� To show that 
it is indeed the case, we will employ the Hohfeldian matrix of jural relations to 
analyse one of the crucial thought experiments supporting the Cohen’s challenge�
HOHFELDIAN MATRIX OF JURAL RELATIONS
To make sense of the argument that we are about to present, it seems helpful to 
remind ourselves of the analysis of fundamental jural conceptions proposed by 
Wesley N� Hohfeld (1913, 1917)� Hohfeld noticed that the word ‘right’ appears 
in the legal discourse in an ambiguous way that causes interpretative problems, 
equivocations and other logical blunders� As he pointed out, all senses in which 
the word ‘right’ is used can and should be – in order to achieve logical consistency 
within the rights-talk – analysed into four distinct conceptions: claim-rights, 
liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunity-rights� Each of these conceptions 
has a different meaning that can be expressed in a precise logical form� For 
our purposes it is enough if we articulate meanings of only claim-rights and 
liberty-rights�
(1)  Person A has a claim-right against person B that person B do φ if and only if 
person B has a duty to person A to do φ� Respectively, person A has a claim-
right against person B that person B do not do φ if and only if person B has 
a duty to person A not to do φ�
(2)  Person A has a liberty-right against person B to do φ if and only if person B 
has a no-claim on person A that person A do not do φ� Respectively, person 
A has a liberty-right against person B not to do φ if and only if person B has 
a no-claim on person A that person A do φ�
3 To the best of our knowledge, it was Alan Wertheimer (1989, pp� 251–255) who pointed out for 
the first time that Cohen’s challenge can be overcome by paying attention to a normative aspect of 
coercion� Drawing on Wertheimer’s original contribution, we would like to explain, by employing 
Hohfeldian analysis, why ignoring this normative aspect makes Cohen’s account flawed and why li-
bertarianism, with its thesis that all rights are property rights (Steiner, 1994, p� 94; Rothbard, 1998, p� 
113), should not be bothered too much by the Cohen’s challenge� 
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It is readily visible that if person B has a no-claim on person A, then person 
A does not have a duty to person B, since person A can have a duty to person B 
if and only if person B has a claim-right against person A (which is the opposite 
of no-claim)� Thus, we can also notice another crucial aspect of the meaning of 
liberty-right:
(3)  Person A has a liberty-right against person B to do φ if and only if person 
A does not have a duty to person B not to do φ� Respectively, person A has 
a liberty-right against person B not to do φ if and only if person A does not 
have a duty to person B to do φ� 
We can therefore conclude that to have a liberty to do φ is to have no duty not 
to do φ; to have a liberty not to do φ is to have no duty to do φ; to have a duty to 
do φ is to have no liberty not to do φ; and to have a duty not to do φ is to have 
no liberty to do φ� It goes without saying that analogous relations hold between 
claim-rights and no-claims�
The aforementioned jural positions and their logical interconnections can 
also be presented in a form of matrix where jural correlates signify logical 
equivalences (as seen from two different points of view) while jural opposites 
logical contradictions (as seen from the same point of view)� Our partial (without 
second order power-rights and immunity-rights) matrix can then look as follows 
(Hohfeld, 1913, p� 30, passim, 1917, p� 710, passim):
Jural correlates
Person A claim liberty
Person B duty no-claim
Jural opposites
Person A claim liberty to liberty not to
Person A no-claim duty not to duty to
It is important to note that any complex subjective rights can be analysed into 
Hohfeldian jural positions (Kramer, 2000, pp� 22–60)� In the case of ownership 
rights, which in the present paper interest us the most, all aspects of this complex 
right can be reduced to fundamental deontic positions: (1) ius possidendi to 
Hohfeldian claim-rights and liberties to possess the resource in question; (2) ius 
utendi, ius fruendi and ius abutendi to liberties to use, to derive income, to destroy 
or waste the resource; (3) ius disponendi to Hohfeldian powers of disposition, 
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management and transmissibility of the resource (see: Epstein, 1985, p� 59; Hon-
oré, 1961, pp� 372–375)� Additionally, Hohfeldian immunities against expropria-
tion and termination of title can easily express other incidents of property rights, 
particularly as construed by the theory of Full Liberal Ownership� Thus, being 
equipped with such precise analytical weaponry, we are ready to examine the 
challenge to the libertarian idea of freedom posed by Cohen�
FREEDOM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
To substantiate his point that libertarianism runs into circularity and relies on 
a counterintuitive account of freedom, Cohen suggests considering the following 
thought experiment� “Suppose farmer Fred owns a tract of land across which 
villager Victor has a right of way� Then, if Fred erects an insurmountable fence 
around the land, Victor is forced to use another route, as Nozick will agree, since 
Fred, in erecting the fence, acted illegitimately� Now consider farmer Giles, whose 
similar tract is regularly traversed by villager William, not as of right, but because 
Giles is a tolerant soul� But then Giles erects an insurmountable fence around 
his land for reasons which justify him in doing so� According to Nozick, William 
may not truly say that, like Victor, he is now forced to use another route� But the 
examples, though different, do not so contrast as to make such a statement false� 
William is no less forced to change his route than Victor is” (Cohen, 1995, p� 36)� 
What would the conclusion that William is also forced to change his route 
boil down to? First of all, as stated by the thought experiment, Giles is the owner 
of the tract of land� It follows then that Giles has, amongst other jural positions, 
a claim-right in rem that other people, William included, do not traverse his 
land without his consent� It also follows that Giles has a vested liberty to erect 
an insurmountable fence around his land for a just reason – as actually admitted 
by Cohen – reason to enforce the aforementioned claim-right included� This 
claim-right and liberty entail in turn on the part of other people, respectively, 
a duty not to traverse Giles’ land without his consent and no-right that Giles 
forebear erecting the fence� What is more, Giles’ rights to the tract of land are not 
whatever rights but property rights� It means that entitlements enjoyed by Giles 
are protected by property rules, not by liability rules (Calabresi & Melamed, 1972, 
pp� 1089–1128; Epstein, 1997, p� 2091; Barnett, 2004, p� 186)� Having said that, it 
is crucial to note that as a part of his property rights Giles has a liberty to erect 
the fence and William has a correlative no-claim that Giles do not erect the fence�
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As stated in the thought experiment, by erecting the fence, Giles makes4 
William to take another route (supposedly, other options, such as not going 
anywhere, are still less appealing to William)� If making William to take another 
route constituted forcing him to do so, then William’s choice to take another 
route would not be a free choice and his expenditure of physical effort to take 
another route would not be a voluntary expenditure� The exchange of his labour 
for getting where he needs to get would then not be a free exchange� Since making 
someone to perform an involuntary action is under libertarianism considered 
violation of his rights, Giles would violate William’s rights if he made him to take 
another route� It follows then that Giles would be at duty not to make William 
to take another route�
Thus, if making William to take another route constituted forcing him, then 
Giles would have a duty not to do that� Yet, as the thought experiment assumed, 
Giles is at liberty to erect the fence and erecting it makes William to take another 
route� It would then be the case that Giles would have a liberty to erect the fence 
and a duty not to make William to take another route� The ensuing problem 
is readily visible� If erecting the fence entails making William to take another 
route, then not making William to take another route entails not erecting the 
fence� If Giles had a duty not to make William to take another route, then he 
would also have a duty not to erect the fence� However, the thought experiment 
assumed that Giles has a liberty to erect the fence, i�e�, no duty not to erect the 
fence� The conclusion that Giles has a duty not to erect the fence contradicts the 
assumption� Therefore, once Cohen assumes that Giles is the owner of the land 
and has a liberty to erect the fence, he cannot at the same time claim without 
running into contradiction that if Giles makes William to take another route by 
erecting the fence, he thereby forces William to do so� For if Giles were forcing 
William, he would be violating his rights, what would in turn mean that Giles 
had no liberty to erect the fence in the first place�
At the same time there is no contradiction in the case of Fred and Victor� 
Remember that Victor has an easement over Fred’s land, i�e�, he has a vested 
liberty to traverse Fred’s land and this liberty is protected by Victor’s right against 
4 ‘Makes’ does not necessarily mean ‘forces’� Whether it does is to be settled in the course of the 
present paper� By ‘makes’ it is rather understood that Giles renders other options, particularly traver-
sing the land, impossible or unappealing to William� Now the bone of contention is what kind of 
making other options unappealing constitutes forcing� According to such libertarians as Nozick or 
Rothbard, it is only illegitimate making that constitutes coercion whereas according to Cohen, making 
does not have to be illegitimate to constitute coercion� 
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Fred and other innumerable people that he ought not to be prevented from 
crossing the tract� This in turn correlatively entails Fred’s duty not to prevent 
Victor from traversing the land� Now if Fred erects the fence, he prevents Vic-
tor from crossing the land and thereby violates Victor’s right� No contradiction 
ensues� What is more, one can also correctly conclude that since by erecting the 
fence Fred makes Victor to take another route, he forces the latter to expend his 
physical effort involuntarily and thereby violates his rights not to be forced to 
exchange his labour without consent� Again, there is nothing contradictory about 
such a conclusion� It is derivable from the assumption that Fred has a duty not to 
erect the fence� If erecting the fence entails making Victor to take another route 
and Fred has a duty not to erect the fence, then Fred has a duty not to make 
Victor to take another route (see: von Wright, 1951, p� 5)� 
To make our point clearer, consider another example5, this time less libertar-
ian in its spirit, since not drawing on the thesis that all rights are property rights 
5 The present example draws on Wertheimer’s original modification of Cohen’s thought experi-
ment� Wertheimer’s argument unfolds as follows: “But is it so obvious that W[illiam] is forced to 
change his route? Yes and no� Yes, it is obvious that there is a descriptive sense in which both V[ictor] 
and W are equally forced to use another route� In what sense, then, can we say that W is not forced 
to use another route? Consider my extension of Cohen’s story� F proposes to sell V a key to a gate that 
will allow V to traverse F’s tract. Because the value of traversing the tract exceeds the cost of the key, V 
buys the key from F. G makes an identical proposal to W, who buys his key from G. Suppose that V and 
W now claim that they made their payments under duress, because, as Cohen says, F’s and G’s actions 
forced them to choose between making payments and what they regard as an unacceptable alternative, 
that is, not being able to traverse the tracts of land� I assume that whereas V can recover his payment, 
even Cohen would grant that W cannot� How could Cohen reach that conclusion? He could say that 
W cannot recover even though he was forced to pay� But, at least with respect to the sense of ‘force’ 
that has the relevant moral implications, we are, in fact, more inclined to say that W voluntarily paid 
for the right of way (whereas V did not)� But I do not want to quibble about words� The point is that 
whatever locutions we want to use here, there is an important distinction between the bindingness 
of W’s agreement and that of V’s agreement� What is going on here? Why should Nozick want to deny 
that there is a sense in which W is forced to go around the tract of land or pay for the right of way? 
And why should Cohen want to deny that there is another sense in which W is not forced to pay? 
I am inclined to think that their errors can be traced to a common difficulty� Both Nozick and Cohen 
assume… Different versions of the ‘right answer’ thesis� Nozick can be read as arguing that the mo-
ralized account of coercion exhaust the field, and that there is no important sense in which W is 
forced to go around the fence� Although, as Cohen observes, that is obviously false, a moralized theory 
of coercion need hardly deny that such justified ‘forcing’ have the effect of constraining actions or 
behavior� On the other hand, Cohen is wrong to assume that a nonmoral account of coercion (or 
forcing) can do the requisite moral work� Cohen can treat all forcings as coercive if he prefers, but 
then he will need another principle to distinguish the coercion or forcing that invalidates agreements 
from coercion or forcing that does not� And, I suggest, even Cohen would need a moralized theory 
to make that sort of distinction” (1989, pp� 252–253)�
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or that we own our labour� Imagine that person A owns a tract of land that is 
customarily traversed by person B� Then person A erects the insurmountable 
fence around the land and demands payment for traversing it (supposedly, 
person A installs the gates in the fence so as to let paying customers traverse 
his land)� Imagine further that taking another route is highly unappealing for 
person B, comparably unappealing as not going anywhere was in the original 
thought experiment (and still is)� Person B is therefore made by person A to 
pay for traversing the land� Is making person B to pay for traversing the land 
forcing them? It seems that Cohen would be committed to conclude that person 
B is now forced by person A to pay for traversing the land� If that were the case, 
then we would also have to conclude that transfer of money from person B to 
person A was involuntary and therefore did not result in the successful transfer 
of property titles; it was rather a money-or-your-life kind of transfer� Yet certainly 
the right to the income (Honoré, 1961, p� 372) belongs to a person’s ownership 
rights� Once we assume that person A is the owner of the tract, we willy-nilly 
assume that person A has a liberty to derive income from their property, e�g�, by 
charging people who would like to traverse the land� This of course precludes 
us, at pains of contradiction, from concluding that person A who is the owner of 
the tract of land forces person B to pay for traversing it, since such a conclusion 
would entail that the transfer of person B’s money is coerced, involuntary, unfree 
and so illegitimate, that it constitutes violation of person B’s property rights and 
that in actual fact person A has always been at duty towards person B not to 
charge her for traversing the land� Yet person A cannot be at the same time and 
in the same respect at a liberty (i�e�, no duty not to) towards person B to charge 
her for traversing the land and at duty towards person B not to charge her for 
doing so�
From all this we should therefore conclude that rejection of normative 
account of freedom and particularly of free exchange, voluntariness, coercion 
and forcing results in contradiction� It cannot be the case that by exercising 
their property rights person A forces person B to perform an action and thereby 
violates person B’s rights� Such a scenario is anathema for a theory of natural or 
moral rights which libertarianism certainly is an instance of� Any theory of natu-
ral rights seeks to describe a set of rationally justified rights� However, nothing 
that is contradictory can be rationally justified� Hence, the answer to the question 
whether person A forces person B to perform or to forego a given action depends 
not only on the question whether person A makes other options unappealing to 
person B but also and crucially on whether person A makes them unappealing 
16 ATHENAEUM
Polish Political Science Studies
vol. 59/2018
illegitimately� Suffering from contradiction as it does, Cohen’s account of freedom 
does not therefore seem superior to the allegedly circular yet non-contradictory 
view of choice, voluntariness and coercion proposed by libertarianism� 
CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper we examined an aspect of a challenge to libertarianism 
formulated by G�A� Cohen� According to this challenge, libertarianism suffers 
from circularity in its theory of freedom, since it defines the latter in terms of 
justice and justice in terms of freedom� Specifically, it seems to Cohen that if 
person A is made to do φ (e�g�, to take another route) by person B, she is forced to 
do φ regardless of the question whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not� 
However, if forcing is understood as an obstacle to a valid transfer of rights – as 
it has always been since Locke’s times – then the question whether person B’s 
actions are legitimate or not appears to be a crucial one� For if person B’s actions 
indeed are legitimate, then it means that person B is at a liberty to perform 
them� If they nonetheless violated person A’s rights by coercing him/her to do 
φ, then as far as we talk about a set of compossible rights (see: Steiner, 1977, pp� 
767–775), they would be able to do it only by breaching person B’s duty not to 
perform actions which violate other people’s rights� Yet as Hohfeldian analysis 
further shows, person B cannot be at the same time, in the same respect and 
to the same person at duty not to do one thing and at a liberty to do the very 
same thing� Liberty-to and duty-not are deontic opposites� Hence, if we wanted 
to adapt Cohen’s idea that person A is forced to do φ by person B regardless of 
the question whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not, we would run into 
contradiction� 
RefeRences:
Barnett, R�E� (2004)� The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law� New York: 
Oxford University Press�
Calabresi, G�, & Melamed, A�D� (1972)� Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability 
Rules: One View of the Cathedral� Harvard Law Review, 85(6), 1089–1128�
Cohen, G�A� (1995)� Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality� New York: Cambridge 
University Press�
17Łukasz Dominiak : Libertarianism, Freedom and the Problem of Circularity 
Epstein, R�A� (1975)� Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal� Journal of Law and 
Economics, 18(2), 293–315�
Epstein, R�A� (1985)� Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain� 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press�
Epstein, R�A� (1997)� A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules� 
The Yale Law Journal, 106(7), 2091–2120� DOI: 10�2307/797162�
Hohfeld, W� (1913)� Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning� The Yale Law Journal, 23(1), 16–59� DOI: 10�2307/785533�
Hohfeld, W� (1917)� Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning� 
The Yale Law Journal, 26(8), 710–770 (cited after: Faculty Scholarship Series, article 
4378)�
Honoré, A� (1961)� Ownership� In: A�G� Guest (ed�), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(pp� 107–126)� Oxford: Oxford University Press�
Kramer, M�H� (2000)� Rights Without Trimmings� In: M�H� Kramer, N�E� Simmonds, 
& H� Steiner, A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (pp� 7–112)� New York: 
Oxford University Press�
Nozick, R� (2014)� Anarchy, State, and Utopia� Oxford: Blackwell Publishers�
Rothbard, M� (1998)� The Ethics of Liberty� New York: New York University Press�
Rothbard, M� (2002)� For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto� New York: Macmil-
lan Publishing�
Steiner, H� (1977)� The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights� Journal of Philosophy, 
74(12), 767–775� DOI: 10�2307/2025928�
Steiner, H� (1994)� An Essay on Rights� Oxford: Blackwell Publishers�
von Wright, G�H� (1951)� Deontic Logic� Mind, 60 (237), 1–15�
Wertheimer, A� (1989)� Coercion� Princeton: Princeton University Press�
